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Abstract (in Italian) 
Lo sviluppo economico della Cina è stato guidato da un assetto istituzionale con alla base una 
scarsa protezione di diritti di proprietà intellettuali (DPIs) e la convinzione che la proprietà sia 
un bene pubblico. Questa prova finale si concentra su uno dei temi più discussi dell’economia 
mondiale: la violazione dei DPIs in Cina dopo aver aderito all’Organizzazione del 
Commercio Mondiale (WTO) nel 2001. L’accesso al WTO è stato considerato una scelta 
strategica per sviluppare un sistema legale di protezione dei DPIs e sostenere gli elevati tassi 
di crescita passati. Nonostante ciò, dal punto di vista esecutivo (Enforcement), sono presenti 
lacune notevoli. Tale questione è culminata con l’avvio, da parte degli USA, di una disputa 
tramite il WTO, prima nel 2007 e recentemente nel 2018, ed all’inizio di una delle guerre 
commerciali più rilevanti in termini di potenziali conseguenze sull’economia mondiale. 
L’elaborato in questione, tramite una analisi istituzionale, mostra che il problema alla base 
non sia strettamente legale, come è erroneamente ritenuto, ma deriva dalle interrelazioni tra il 
più ampio assetto istituzionale dal punto di vista formale (politiche ed economiche) ed 
informale (convenzioni). Guanxi, uno dei pilastri delle istituzioni informali definito come 
‘rete di scambio di favori’, influenza notevolmente i governi locali che traggono benefici dalle 
attività di violazione dei DPIs. Inoltre, il concetto di DPI è stato recentemente introdotto in 
Cina, che, citando Hofstede (1990), si caratterizza per essere culturalmente ‘collettivista’. 
Nonostante le istituzioni informali siano difficilmente modificabili, implicazioni fondamentali 
evidenziano che intervenendo sulle istituzioni economiche, promuovendo l’innovazione alla 
base del vantaggio competitivo, si generi un sistema esecutivo in tema di DPIs pienamente 
efficiente.  
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Introduction 
 
China has witnessed a remarkable economic growth, starting from being a rural and poor 
country in the 1980s to become the second largest economy in the 21st century. The economic 
development has been fostered by an institutional shift that, however, significantly differ from 
what advanced countries have experienced. The divergence regards the lack of intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) which, being a fundamental component of economic institutions, are 
counterbalanced by strong social (or informal) institutions, namely code of conducts. The gap 
in the institutional setting undermines not only the relationships with foreign countries, but 
also the domestic economy that might not sustain the impressive economic growth in an era 
increasingly based on innovation as the source of competitive advantage. Pressured by foreign 
economies, especially USA, China is now aware of the importance to internalise IPRs, 
leading to the introduction of the concept in the legal environment. In this respect, the 
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been widely and wisely considered a 
strategic and pivotal choice. Indeed, one of the core Agreements underpinning the WTO, 
namely the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 
provides members with common regulations in terms of IPRs. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the admirable progresses, the issue of counterfeiting activities is still 
widespread in the Chinese business environment. There seems to be, indeed, a paradox. China 
is increasingly known as having a strong IP legal regime after joining the WTO; however, it is 
still considered as a high-risk environment for IPRs infringements (Prud’Homme and Taolue 
2017). A report by the European Commission (2018) states that China continues to be 
‘Priority 1’ since longstanding issues in the field of IPRs are persistent. According to the 
Global Intellectual Property Centre, 86% of all physical counterfeiting activities come from 
China and Hong Kong (New 2016). Moreover, if just the USA are taken into consideration, 
the percentage increases to 90% (by value) (Plane and Livingston 2017). These alarming 
statistics led the USA to take initiatives against China through the WTO Dispute Settlement 
in 2007, citing inconsistencies with some articles of the Agreement. The same situation 
resurfaced some years later, in 2018, under the Trump administration. The President directed 
the United States Trade Representative (USTP) to investigate Chinese practices and laws, 
concluding that China has always taken advantages of the USA (Withers 2018). This led to 
the initiation of another dispute through the WTO, arguing that the Chinese institutional 
framework was not consistent with Articles 3 and 28 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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Addressing the issue from the mere legal point of view, however, might not lead to a 
sustainable solution. The recent dispute initiated by USA will probably have a similar result 
of the previous one, leading to short-term benefits that give way to the usual enforcement 
issues in the medium and long run. An analysis of the broader institutional setting will be 
instrumental in getting an insight into the deeper source of the problem and potential solutions 
and policies to mitigate the counterfeiting activities, promoting a further institutional shift in 
consistency with international standards. By broader institutional setting, the paper draws 
upon the classification adopted by Douglass North (2000), who split institutions into 2 macro-
areas: formal and informal. Furthermore, formal and informal institutions, which are highly 
context-specific, are interrelated, suggesting that the deeper source of the problem and the 
consequent potential resolving policies might not be clearly identifiable. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The first chapter, after providing an introductive and 
theoretical overview of institutions, will drive the reader into the economic development 
undertaken by China. A separate section will be dedicated to the structure of the WTO, 
underlying the further institutional improvement that China might foster upon accession to the 
WTO.  The second chapter will provide a more detailed and close insight into the relationship 
between the WTO and China, showing legal improvements but also flaws in IPRs 
enforcement. The last chapter, finally, undertakes a broader institutional analysis to identify 
the way China might improve deficiencies in IPRs. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Institutions and economic development 
 
The neo-classical economic theory assumes that human beings are rational, able to make 
decisions that maximize their utility function. Actors face transaction costs (Williamson and 
Masten 1999) due to bounded rationality: the impossibility to gather and process the 
information available in the external environment (Simon 1972). Even though individuals 
could sometimes show rationality, ‘This individual achievement does not generate…a socially 
efficient outcome’ (Olson 1996, p.6).  This explains the existence of institutions, which are 
crucial to characterise the complexity of a country in economic terms.  
 
As stated by North (1994), institutions are made up of formal rules and informal constraints. 
The former are simply rules put in place, such as laws and regulations, that are clearly 
defined; the latter, in contrast, do not show up in formal terms, but are ways of doing things 
embedded within a specific country and draw upon the differences on the cultural dimensions 
identified by Hofstede (1990). As argued by North (2003), the market-supporting institutions 
are highly dependent on the political ones. The polity makes and puts in place the economic 
rules of the game. These essentially concern property rights: not only property rights in terms 
of rules about how property is used, alienated and owned, but also property rights in terms of 
the effectiveness of enforcing contracts and agreements in laws.  
 
It is clear that institutions are the underlying fundamentals of a country and its economic 
performance (Rodrik and Subramanian 2003); an incentive structure that drives the individual 
economic decisions and the long-term effects on the overall country. Consequently, economic 
development might be fostered by interventions in the deeper institutional context, rather than 
mere economic interventions that involve accumulation of inputs, promoting scarce short-
term benefits as a result of the law of diminishing returns. Indeed, the relationship between 
institutions and sustainable economic development has been tested, and positively confirmed, 
econometrically through regressing current performance on current institutions, using ‘settler 
mortality rates’ as an instrumental variable (Acemoglu et al. 2001). The use of the latter is 
motivated by the endogeneity of the independent variable: high-performant economies, 
indeed, might afford better institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2010) and so development 
clearly influences the quality of institutions in a circular process. The result of the regression 
has a more important implication behind the mere fundamental relationship between 
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institutions and economic performance: the former is path-dependent and highly influenced 
by country-specific features; not easily modifiable due to existence of informal institutions, 
namely culture and code of conducts, along with formal ones, like laws and regulations 
(North 2003). 
 
This explains why, given the acknowledged importance of institutions to promote growth, 
countries show different institutional frameworks and evidence towards an institutional 
convergence is scarce. Indeed, informal institutions are highly embedded within a specific 
regional/national context and not easy to change. Additionally, despite specific formal 
institutions might be built through a process of imitation of advanced countries, it is believed 
that the process might not be immediate since informal institutions still shape and influence 
the formal ones and are dependent upon contextual events. 
 
In agreement with the above analysis, Rodrik (2000) underlines, on the one hand, the 
existence of specific market-supporting formal institutions while, on the other hand, the 
impossibility of mapping unique formal and informal constraints. About the former, he 
identifies as fundamental: property rights, regulatory institutions, institutions for 
macroeconomic stabilization and social insurance and institutions of conflict management. 
Regarding the latter, he emphasizes the importance of overcoming Westernised best practices 
and drawing upon ‘local knowledge’ to experiment something unique to the specific context. 
This outlines again that building good institutions do not mean following standardized formal 
rules but refers to the interplay of the latter with informal and unique constraints (Rodrik 
2001). 
 
Given the interdependence between political and economic institutions, a wide range of 
research focuses on the importance to develop the former to sustain the latter. In this regard, 
Birdsall (2007) argues that the political party needs to mirror the ‘Developmental State’ (DS): 
autonomy from interest groups and accountability. Most advanced countries meet these 
requirements, which might highlight the reliability of this model to analyse the strength of the 
institutional setting of a country.  
 
The institutional shift towards a more market-based approach in China 
 
Applying this model to China, however, the requirements of DS by Birdsall (2007) are not 
met. About the former, China is a high-corrupted country ranking 79/176 relatively to other 
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countries (Transparency International 2018) and one of the most unequal: Gini coefficient had 
risen from 0.2 to 0.5 since the reforms took place (Chan and Gao 2015). Regarding the latter, 
China keeps a centralized political structure which, according to institutional theory, might 
prevent economic development (Tasneem 2015). Consequently, if economic institutions 
depend upon the political ones, the former should not be well-developed to sustain economic 
growth. Nevertheless, this is in contrast with the recent outstanding economic development. 
Indeed, Knight (2014) states that there are different DSs that share two common 
characteristics that coexist in China: promotion of economic growth and incentives to achieve 
it. Deng prioritized the stability of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and economic growth 
through an approach known as ‘Regionally Decentralised Authoritarianism’ (RDA): political 
centralization and decentralized economic management (Jin et al. 2005). 
 
Improving the economic performance as a priority is the result of the necessity to get the 
support of the citizens after the terrible outcome of the Cultural Revolution, which underlines 
again the importance of contextual elements. Up until the 1978, China was a closed economy 
among the poorest in the world. 82% of the population lived in rural areas, but rural incomes 
had been stagnant for more than a decade.  More than 60% of the population lived on less 
than one dollar a day and famine was an ever-present concern. Moreover, heedless 
industrialization had left China with even less arable land to feed its people and 
unemployment was an especially timely issue.  
However, through the above-mentioned RDA approach, economic reforms were implemented 
gradually, inspired by the powerful market economies but with a strong focus on informal 
institutions. 
 
The early agricultural reforms, with the introduction of the ‘House Responsibility System’ 
(HRS), are a clear example. Each family was given a piece of land to farm and operated under 
a dual-track system: production of a fixed quantity to sell to the government at fixed prices 
and opportunity to retain the surplus and sell it at market-based prices. This led to the creation 
of a set of incentives, increasing the output by over 61% from 1978 to 1984, during which 
participation reached 99% (Xu 2011).  
 
The success of the reform provided savings that boosted the non-agricultural sector: China’s 
agricultural labor force declined from 70% in 1980 to 40% in around 2000 (Qian 2002). 
These increasing savings began to be directed to collectively-owned firms ruled by local 
government, named ‘Township and Village Enterprises’ (TVEs) which grew at 28.1% per 
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year between 1981 and 1990 (Xu 2011; Tasnem 2015). TVEs were successful thanks to the 
interplay among local management and informal constraints (Qian 2002; Högberg 2009). 
About the latter, it is believed that culture is a key component. Figure 1 shows the cultural 
analysis of China, drawing upon the cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede (1990). What 
strikes immediately the attention is the low score on the individualism dimension, suggesting 
that China is a highly collectivist society. This dimension explains the success of TVEs and 
the counterpart lack of IPRs, which is the key flaw of the institutional setting. In addition to 
this, Power Distance refers to the fact that inequalities amongst people are generally accepted, 
influencing the long-standing layered political outlook, which is further reinforced by a long-
term oriented culture. 
 
 
Figure 1: Analysis of the Chinese culture (Hofstede Insights, 2018). 
 
 
The highly competitive context, that is the consequence of the decentralized approach, 
promoted efficiency (Xu 2011). This led to the counterpart decline of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), whose output decreased from 77.6% to 28.8% from 1978 to 1996 (Lin et al. 1998).  
Like HRS, the adoption of ‘Management Responsibility System’ (MRS) increased the 
productivity but caused high corruption and financial problems particularly between 1993 and 
1998: this had repercussions on the financial sector leading to increasing non-performing 
loans and negative performances (Xu 2011). Consequently, the solution was to privatise the 
small SOEs and separate commercial and policy purposes, resulting in bad loans drop from 
16.84% to 2.81% at the end of 2003 (Hou 2011): Perkins (1988), however, underlines that 
loans are still provided for political reasons and the financial sector is fragile. The success of 
TVEs over SOEs, and the consequent financial crisis, is again the confirmation that strong 
informal institutions outperform formal ones. 
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In line with the institutional theory, China adopted an export-led strategy: exports increased 
from 3.4% a year to 14.1% a year after the reforms and, in contrast to SSA, 70% were about 
manufactures (Perkins 1994). Moreover, the impact of foreign direct investments (FDI) was 
tested in specific zones: ‘Special Economic Zones’ (SEZs). The enormous success led to the 
expansion of the reform throughout the country, rising from 4 to 342 from 1980 to 2005 while 
SEZs share of FDI from 35.9% to 95.3% in the same years (Xu 2011). 
 
 China shows an institutional setting that can differ greatly from best practices institutions that 
are often the object of institutional reform in the developing world. This underlines the 
Importance of contextual forces, both informal institutions and specific initial events, that 
might counterbalance ineffective formal ones, such as in terms of property rights, explaining 
the impressive recent growth rate in China.  
 
China and the consequences of transitional institutions: WTO as a solution? 
 
The above section proves that economic development, as an output, can be fostered through 
various specific institutional settings. The comparison of the recent Chinese economy and the 
period prior to the reforms clearly underlines the power of the institutional shift. Since 
reforms, GDP per capita constantly grew, starting from 156.4$ in 1978 to 8,132.6$ in 2016 
(World Bank Data 2018). However, Tisdell (2009) underlines that the transitional institutions 
led to high economic growth at really high social costs, mainly environmental issues and 
distribution inequality. As regards the environment, China loses approximately 6.5% of GDP 
due to pollution and air pollution contributes to 1.6 million deaths per year (4,400 per day) 
(Rohde and Muller 2015). About social inequality, before the reforms took place, China’s 
distribution system was characterised by egalitarianism in all aspects, as the Gini coefficient 
of 0.16 at that time clearly shows. It is estimated that the coefficient progressively increased 
to 0.55 in 2002 (Yueh 2013). In this regard, a study by Chan et al. (2015) suggest that 
inequality has a positive impact on overall household consumption in mature economies with 
well-developed financial market (e.g., OECD countries) and negative impact in developing 
countries with less sophisticated capital markets. This is not, however, the case of China due 
to weak financial institutions as a result of a massive ‘Shadow Banking System’ (The 
Economist 2018). 
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This analysis underlines that, as stated by Knight (2014), different DSs are instrumental to 
foster economic development, regardless of meeting the conditions identified by Birdsall 
(2007): autonomy from interest groups and accountability. The latter, however, are 
fundamental to promote economic development minimising, at the same time, social costs. It 
is widely acknowledged, indeed, that China cannot sustain the impressive growth rates if 
improvements in the institutional setting, towards a more Westernised approach, are not 
implemented. The view is also shared by Minxin (2006) who highlights that democratic 
reforms, respectful of Birdsall’s conditions, are required to sustain economic growth. Further, 
the authors outline a positive relationship between economic development and authoritarian 
liberalisation which, however, did not occur in China. According to the authors, the lack of 
development of the political institutions is the consequence of weak rule of law, which is the 
foundation for sustainable long-term growth. 
 
The Chinese tradition is rich of codes and conducts (strong informal institutions) that 
counterbalance weak legal rules, which were almost absent before 1949. The importance of 
rule of law has been acknowledged in the second half of the 20th century by Mao and Deng 
who, however, subordinate legal reforms to the more important economic achievements to 
assure the political control. The legal reforms are associated with significant shortcomings 
and bottlenecks that require an immediate intervention to improve the institutional setting and 
sustain the impressive economic growth rates. The Chinese legal system lacks the 
independence from the single party to function as the guarantor of law, undermining the long-
term development of the legal setting. Additionally, local governments have substantial 
influence upon courts since presidents and vice presidents are appointed by the local 
governments. Moreover, the scarce knowledge about laws, along with high corruption and 
weak enforcement, makes Chinese legal system unpredictable, discouraging the big 
opportunities to do business. These domestic institutional shortcomings needed an external 
push towards institutional improvements: the accession to the WTO in 2001, which was 
indeed considered as a ‘National policy’ by the Chinese government, contributed to a 
significant institutional upgrade. 
 
WTO: functions, structure and principles 
 
Trade has played a key role in supporting economic development, promoting a strong need to 
be worldwide integrated. Since 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
has been the focal point for trade regulation on an international scale, initially focused on 
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tariff agreements but, over time, extended to non-tariff policies (Jackson 1990). The GATT 
increasingly attracted many more countries but was a highly-flexible institution since 
negotiations usually occurred among a subset of countries and were not universally applicable 
(Jackson 2000). However, as a result of the Marrakesh Agreement in 1994, the WTO was 
officially established, based on the same principles as the GATT, but providing a common 
institutional framework applicable to all the members (Matsushita et al. 2006).  
Additionally, whereas the GATT mainly dealt with trade in goods, the WTO and its 
agreements also cover trade in services and intellectual property rights (Hoekman and 
Kostecki 1995). Indeed, the WTO builds upon broad principles, which are the GATT, GATS 
and TRIPS. Unlike the latter, GATT and GATS comprise additional agreements and annexes 
coping with special requirements of specific sectors or issues. Finally, there are detailed lists 
of commitments made by individual members allowing specific products/services access to 
their market (Matsushita et al. 2006).  
 
GATT, GATS and TRIPS are the Multilateral Agreements contained in the Annex 1, the first 
of 4 Annexes. Annex 2, instead, contains the WTO’s common dispute settlement mechanism: 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). 
Indeed, countries can bring disputes to the WTO if they believed that the agreements are 
being violated. This is fundamental for enforcing the rules and assuring that trade flows 
smoothly. Annex 3 contains an instrument for surveillance of members’ trade policies, known 
as ‘Trade Policy Review Mechanism ‘(TPRM). Finally, Annex 4 contains agreements that 
were not widely shared in the Uruguay Round and bind only a subset of countries (Matsushita 
et al. 2006).  
 
Given the content-based and institutional differences between the GATT 1994 and the WTO, 
the structure of the latter is far more complicated (Matsushita et al. 2006). The structure is 
headed by the Ministerial Conference, composed of all members of the WTO, which has full 
power on the agreements and meet roughly once every 2 years. Between these sessions, the 
functions are exercised by the general Council, whose meetings are held about 12 times a 
year. The GC is in charge of the effective management of the organisation and handles urgent 
matters. Additionally, the structure of the WTO comprises 3 groups of subsidiaries that report 
constantly to the GC. The most important group consist of 3 Councils that supervise the 
obligations undertaken by the members under the GATT, GATS and TRIPS. A second set is 
in charge of broad responsibilities that cover sectoral responsibilities while a third group is 
responsible for the Plurilateral Agreements (Annex 4). 
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Despite the marked differences, significant similarities can be highlighted. The WTO 
continues to be member-driven and operate by consensus (Matsushita 2004). More 
importantly, the pre-1994 GATT and the WTO share the same principles that characterise the 
institutional framework of the organisation (Hoekman et al. 2202): non-discrimination, 
reciprocity, enforceable commitments, transparency, and safety valves. 
 
Non-discrimination 
This principle builds upon 2 components: the most-favoured-nation (MFN) rule and the 
national treatment principle. The former involves the necessity to treat a specific product no 
less favourably than a similar one that originates from another country (Suwanprasert, 2016). 
As an example, if a tariff of 4% is applied to a product, the same rate needs to be imposed to 
imports of the same product from all the WTO members, incentivising the selection of the 
lowest-cost foreign supplier and lowering negotiation costs. The National treatment requires 
to treat foreign goods, in terms of internal taxation, as the domestic goods, ensuring that the 
liberalisation efforts are not neutralised by domestic taxes (Matsushita et al. 2006).  
 
Reciprocity 
The non-discrimination pillar aims at preventing potential free-riding behaviours, which is 
avoided by the reciprocity principle: mutual advantages directed to substantial reduction of 
tariffs and barriers. Mattoo and Olarreaga (2004) underline that the achievement of a balanced 
concession of liberalisation is driven by political forces that leads to a more efficient outcome. 
In this respect, Bagwell and Staiger (1999) offer an economic interpretation: reciprocity 
neutralises the effects caused by unilateral attempt to reduce protectionism, promoting a 
greater degree of liberalisation.  
 
Binding and Enforceable Commitments 
The above 2 principles embody a strong liberalised orientation. However, once these 
measures have been adopted, it is important to verify that countries do not take nontariff 
actions that nullify the tariff concession. The existence of dispute settlement procedures 
allows to prevent any unilateral action that might harm the overall beneficial achievements 
(Matsushita et al. 2006).  
 
Transparency 
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The enforcement of commitments requires the access of information on trade, placing 
‘transparency’ as a crucial principle in the WTO. A large number of committees verify if the 
provisions are respected and exchange constantly information with members, who are 
required to publish their trade regulations compatible with the institutional setting provided by 
the WTO. This principle drastically reduces uncertainty and promotes an institutional 
convergence key for increasing trade and beneficial for all the members. 
 
Safety values 
An important principle embedded within the WTO grant members the possibility to restrict 
trade, which might be motivated by several circumstances. Government might need to protect 
public health and national security that are damaged by an aggressive international 
competition fostered by the WTO. Additionally, the organisation allows to impose 
countervailing duties on subsidised imports and antidumping duties on dumped imports. 
Finally, further provisions involve actions in case of serious balance of payments difficulties 
or driven by the necessity to support infant industries. 
 
It is clear from the principles that the WTO provides an institutional setting closer to the most 
advanced countries, so requiring strong formal institutions. The institutional framework is 
characterised by open and fair trade, stability and predictability to encourage investments, job 
creation and competition.  The positive impact on trade is widely acknowledged in the 
literature but is highly dependent on the acceptance of the strong requirements. Indeed, 
Subramanian and Wei (2006) underline that the WTO significantly contributes to improving, 
in terms of both quantity and quality, world trade, but the positive effects are uneven: benefits 
are highly correlated to the degree of liberalisation.  
 
Given that the access to the WTO brings substantial benefits, China shows an institutional 
setting that, prior to 2001, is not fully compatible with the WTO. Thus, might promote 
pressure to converge towards a more western-style approach, resulting in improvements in the 
institutional framework and so sustain the impressive recent growth rates. With respect to 
IPRs, WTO might be seen as an inevitable push towards the development of strong 
institutions in a field in which China has always been inadequate due to cultural reasons. A 
report by Business Software Alliance (2010) showed that the rate of piracy hit 54% in 2001, 
reflecting a strong need to solve the issue through external forces. As figure 1 clearly shows, 
GDP per capita grew more rapidly after China accessed the WTO in 2001. However, it has 
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been also argued that the institutional context is highly country-specific, and any potential 
change might be challenging, particularly due to strong informal institutions. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: GDP per capita in China from 1968 to 2017 (World Bank Data, 2018). 
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Chapter 2 
 
Effects of the WTO on the legal system in China 
 
As shown in figure 2, the WTO has certainly had a positive impact on the Chinese 
institutional framework, leading to a greater convergence between WTO-based international 
standards and the institutions in China. The external push by the WTO, and the constant 
relationships between China and the WTO members, have been fundamental to improve the 
institutional setting from a legal point of view, which would have not been easily possible 
drawing just upon domestic forces.  
This section will evaluate if China meets the WTO legal requirements, which are deeply 
related to the more general principles listed in the previous chapter: transparency; equality; 
and due process and justiciability of government action. 
 
Transparency 
After the accession to the WTO, the Chinese legal system has been characterised by an 
impressive progress in terms of transparency. In the past, many laws were unknown because 
the government was not incentivised to make them public; with the WTO requirements, 
however, transparency became part of the Chinese culture. According to its Protocol, China 
undertook that only those WTO-related laws, regulations, and other measures that are 
published and readily available to other WTO members, individuals and enterprises shall be 
enforced. Besides, "China shall make available to WTO Members, upon request, all laws, 
regulations and other measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, TRIPS or 
the control of foreign exchange before such measures are implemented or enforced. In 
emergency situations, laws, regulations and other measures shall be made available at the 
very latest when they are implemented or enforced" (WTO 2001, p.3). This led to legislative 
changes in the domestic setting. Indeed, Lam (2009) shows that the ‘Regulations on Open 
Government Information’ obliges government departments to publicise information about a 
wide range of matters. Additionally, individuals have the right to be informed through a 
written inquiry and must receive an answer within 15 days.  
 
Equality 
Drawing upon the article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and political Rights 
(ICCPPR) (United Nations Human Rights 2018), the principle of equality means that 
everyone is treated equally, without discrimination. Although the concept was present in the 
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People's Republic of China (PRC) Constitution, the principle of non-discrimination began to 
be fully translated into a wide range of laws, not only trade-related, after joining the WTO, 
which led to an increasing public awareness of the notion of equality and non-discrimination 
principle. Additionally, the impressive growth after joining the WTO (see figure 2) led to 
growing disparities that have been instrumental in embedding the concept within the Chinese 
institutional setting. Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that growing social disparity is highly 
correlated with social protests (Bebbington 2010). In this regard, Wang (2006) underlines that 
riots constantly grew over time, increasing by 28% between 2013 and 2014. This led to an 
informal process that incorporated progressively the principle of equality into the Chinese 
legal system, mirrored by legislative changes that represent a process of institutional 
change/convergence. 
 
 
Due process and Justiciability of Government Actions 
The principle of due process, referring to the administration of justice according to established 
rules and regulations, has witnessed a massive influence on Chinese legal system after joining 
the WTO (He 2008). Moser and Yu (2015) underline that the ‘Provisional Rules for Taxation 
Administrative Reconsideration’ of 2004 clearly states that lack of respect of the due process 
is unlawful. Lam (2009) highlights that a large number of laws, despite not using specifically 
the term ‘due process’, require that people in similar situations need to be treated equally, 
along with the right to defend themselves. This marks a huge difference compared to some 
years earlier, when the arbitrary practices played a more significant role, underlying a shift 
from ‘China’ disinterested government’ (Yao 2008) to a deeper focus on the rule of law 
(Mazur and Ursu 2017). The concept of due process is highly related to the Justiciability of 
Government Actions. The Accession Protocol requires that China establishes impartial 
tribunals and agencies ready to challenge governmental acts and policies that beyond the 
power provided by law. 
 
 
The increasing relevance of IPRs and the consistency with the TRIPS Agreement 
 
The legislative improvements involved also the more specific field of property rights, which 
has always been crucial and critical for the long-term development of the Chinese economy.  
It is widely acknowledged in the literature the positive relationship between IPRs and 
economic development (Gould and Gruben 1996; Maskus 2000; Chang 2001; Li 2011). As an 
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example, Barton and Ezekiel (2005) highlight that Patent Law is a crucial policy in today 
dynamic business environment, fundamental to be globally competitive. Furthermore, Dutton 
(1984) provides an interesting overview of different scholars, underlying that during the late 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the grant of patents has been key to drive the 
industrialisation in Britain and the evolution towards an advanced and high-income economy. 
  Juxtaposing the Western world with the Chinese one, it is easily noticeable a significant 
difference in the development of IPRs, which might be easily explained by cultural reasons. 
Indeed, the Western focused always on the importance of protecting the innovative ideas of 
individuals while, in China, it was believed that knowledge belonged to the State, mirroring 
the high-collectivist society and the Confucian values (Lehman 2006). However, by the end 
of the 19th century, China experienced significant changes driven by the strong need to 
improve the domestic institutional setting to sustain high growth rates. This led the Chinese 
government to adopt Patent, Copyright and Trademark laws, and join the IPR protection 
conventions. 
 
Given the Increasing importance of IPR protection in the Chinese institutional context and the 
significant efforts towards the introduction of IPRs, in occasion of accession to the WTO, 
China was immediately bound to the TRIPs Agreement without the favourable concession 
granted to emerging economies: less developed countries, indeed, have five years to 
acknowledge the TRIPS Agreement in the domestic institutional setting (Bermann and 
Mavroidis 2007). It was believed, however, that the institutional setting in China had already 
internalised the significance of IPR and ready to embrace the WTO-based regulations in terms 
of IPR, which would have promoted additional improvements of the institutions towards a 
more Westernised and international setting.  
 
The TRIPS, along with the GATT and GATS, is one of the multilateral treaties representing 
the foundation of the system WTO. Building upon the WTO-based principles treated in 
chapter 1, it sets international standards, in the field of IPRs, that members need to respect, so 
developing common institutional frameworks. After Part 1 (Articles 1-8) lists general 
information and the basic principles of the Agreement, Part 2 (Articles 9-40) establishes 
substantive rules in every form of IPR: copyright and related rights; trademarks; geographical 
indications; industrial designs; patents; layout designs of integrated circuits and undisclosed 
information. These rules have led to substantial modifications to Chinese legal environment. 
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About Patents, Chinese Patent Law was first introduced in 1984 (Patent Law 2008) and was 
modified several times until major changes were undertaken upon accession to WTO in 2001. 
Article 22 is fully consistent with Article 27 of TRIPS since it requires that inventions, in 
order to be patentable, need to be ‘novel, creative and of practical use’. Additionally, Article 
11 now perfectly reproduces Article 28 of TRIPS, including the rights to forbid the offer for 
sale of the patented inventions. As regards trademarks, China’s trademark law was introduced 
for the first time in 1982 (Trademark Law 2014) and the accession to the WTO eliminated all 
the disparities with the TRIPS Agreement. Indeed, Article 8 first included just ‘words, 
graphics and their combination’ while now it is fully consistent with Article 15 of TRIPS, 
including a wider range of elements such as letters and numerals. Further, Article 13 protects 
well-known marks, which have always been an issue in China, undermining successful 
international relations. As an example, China refused DuPont’s application to register its 
trademark ‘Feon’ since the translation was already in use for refrigerants by Chinese 
manufacturers (Yang et al. 2004). However, given the binding TRIPS agreement, China now 
protects well-known marks in the domestic environment. 
 
It is interesting to notice that geographical indications, defined by the TRIPS as the 
indications that identify a good, were not taken into account prior to 2001 (Farah and Cima 
2010). The Chinese legal environment now requires that a trademark must not be registered if 
it contains misleading information. Even in terms of copyright, Chinese legal environment has 
been modified prior to join the WTO, but after 2001 further modifications have been made to 
be consistent with TRIPS (Copyright Law 2010). Article 21 is in line with Article 12 of 
TRIPS, requiring that the term of protection includes the lifetime of the author plus 50 years. 
The same convergence trend can be acknowledged as far as rental rights are concerned since 
Article 10 and 41 of China’s Copyright Law are consistent with Article 11 of TRIPS. China, 
indeed, provides authors and successors with the right to authorise or prohibit the commercial 
rental. 
 
it is clear that China became aware of the significance of IPRs when reforms started in the 
1980s, initialising modifications in the legal environment. In this regard, the accession to the 
WTO has been fundamental and instrumental to promote further changes and complement the 
convergence towards international standards. However, legislative changes are necessary but 
not sufficient since these laws need to be ‘workable’. Consequently, Part 3 of TRIPS (Articles 
41-61) deals with the enforcement rules, which complement the previous section of the 
Agreement, providing a comprehensive IPRs setting. A large number of scholars outline 
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improvements even in the field of enforcement, which has been closely monitored by the 
WTO members thanks to a post-accession monitoring mechanism, named ‘Transitional 
Review Mechanism (TRM). A report by the OECD (2005) underline that the number 
infringement cases involving copyrights increased fourfold over 2002, while the number of 
cases involving patents and trademarks increased respectively by 67% and 13%.  
 
 Particularly, there are two ways to assert IPRs in China (Lam 2007; Farah and Cima 2010): 
administrative enforcement or through a criminal or judicial procedure. About the former, the 
owner of IPR provides evidence to the local branch of the agency in charge of protection of 
IPRs, which would take actions to confiscate illegal goods. This is the most common method 
and, even though it does not offer financial compensation to the owner, it imposes substantial 
costs on the infringer. Conversely, judicial procedure has recently witnessed a significant 
growth, which is the result, indeed, of strengthening the institutional environment after 
joining the WTO. Data show a nearly 50% annual increase of judicial cases from 2002, 
followed by more guidance, transparency and larger efforts to ensure improvements of 
judges’ qualifications (Sepetys and Cox 2008). Local courts are equipped with divisions 
specialised on IPRs (Li and Zhang 2008) and when such divisions are missing, panels are 
established to deal with the matter (Torremans et al. 2007).  
 
An ex Chief Judge of the IP Tribunal od the Supreme People’s Court of China, Jiang Zhipei 
(2013), gave some statistics highlighting improvements of the IPR enforcement system. 
Particularly, the number of First Instance IP litigations accepted in 2012 was 87,419 civil 
cases, increasing by 45.99% from 2011. Additionally, administrative and criminal cases 
witnessed respectively an increase of 20.35% and 129.61% in the same period of time, 
amounting to 2,928 and 13,104 (Zhipei, 2013). Nevertheless, he pointed out that there are 
flaws in the system and consequent improvements to be made. As an example, more support 
from the court in certain circumstances is needed, such as when the infringer refuses to 
provide evidence while, in patent litigation cases, improvements in the overall process are 
requires, like technical appraisals and expert consultations. 
 
Enforcement deficiencies: WTO-China disputes initiated by US 
 
Despite the improvements of the legal institutions in terms of IPRs, which are believed to 
promote the adequate institutional changes to sustain the impressive economic growth, much 
criticism is addressed to the Chinese enforcement system. Legitimate businesses are estimated 
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to suffer annual losses of US$250- 750 billion in lost sales as a result of counterfeited and 
pirated goods (Mercurio 2012). The issue is mostly critical in US: the United States Trade 
Representative highlights an infringement rate of nearly 90% for all forms of IPRs. The USA 
started a WTO case against China for the scarce law enforcement, pointing out that some 
Chinese measures were inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement. Particularly, the accuse 
involved 3 matters (United States Trade Representative 2009).  
 
Firstly, the USA outline that China violated Article 41.1 and 61 of the TRIPS Agreement, in 
regard to the thresholds for criminal procedures and penalties: the critical points are Articles 
213-218 of the China’s Criminal Law. In this regard, the already-mentioned articles allow to 
start criminal procedures if the amount of sales is huge, so preventing a wide range IPRs 
owners to implement a successful procedure to defend their rights if the infringers keep the 
sales under the threshold.  
The second area of concern regards the disposal of goods confiscated by the Chinese 
authorities that infringe IPRs. The USA accused China to put into markets all the goods that 
have been identified as infringers of IPRs, so misleading the consumers about the real value 
and being inconsistent with Articles 46 and 59 of the TRIPS Agreement. Finally, China does 
not protect works whose distribution and reproduction have not been authorised, being 
therefore inconsistent with Art. 5(1) of the Berne Convention as incorporated in Art. 9.1, as 
well as with Art. 41.1, as the copyright in such prohibited works cannot be enforced. 
 
The dispute settlement procedure consists of initial consultations among the WTO members 
which, if not helpful to settle the dispute within 60 days, the complaining party, USA in this 
case, has the right to establish a panel at the next DBS meeting. The panel concluded that 
China should extend the protection also to unauthorised works, so violating Article5(1) of the 
Berne Convention and Article 41.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, in relation to enforcement 
matters (WTO Dispute Settlement 2010). Additionally, the panel determined that Chinese 
actions were inconsistent with Article 59 by putting into the market channel infringed goods 
after removing the trademark. However, in relation to the attempt not to provide criminal 
procedures below certain numerical thresholds, the panel recognised that this was not 
sufficient to verify the violation of the TRIPS agreement. Indeed, the latter simply sets 
minimum requirements, especially in Part 3 about enforcement of the rules, so members 
might usually take arbitrary initiatives to comply to the Agreement.  
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The losing party has the obligation to comply with the recommendations of the panel, which 
involves bringing the Copyright Law and the Customs measures into conformity with its 
obligations under the TRIPS Agreement (Roy, 2000). This happens within a ‘reasonable 
period of time’: 12 months starting from the 20th of March 2009, when the DSB adopted the 
panel report. After exactly a year, China confirmed the amendments of the Chinese Copyright 
Law and the decision to revise the Regulations for Customs Protection of Intellectual Property 
Rights (WTO Dispute Settlement 2010). Thus, it had completed all necessary domestic 
legislative procedures for implementing the DSB recommendations and rulings. 
 
The WTO dispute, culminated with the binding report issued by the panel, highlights 
important points. First of all, despite the initial domestic legislative changes undertaken 
before 2001 and the further modifications upon accession to the WTO, some gaps in the legal 
institutional environment might persist, as we have seen in regard to the Copyright Law. 
Nevertheless, the WTO dispute forces the losing party to amend the domestic law to fill the 
gap and further promote convergence towards international standards. It might be concluded 
that China has now a strong legal system in regard to IPRs as most advanced countries. 
However, strong institutional settings depend not only on the legislative side bus also on the 
way these rules are enforced. In this regard, enforcement deficiencies are still widespread in 
China, counterbalancing the outstanding improvements in the legal institutions.  
 
The persistent problem on IPRs infringement: recent (stagnant) developments 
 
A recent report by the EU (2016) underlines that China is still the world's main producer of 
counterfeited goods. This has been supported by a recent study by the OECD/EUIPO (2016), 
highlighting that Chinese goods represent the 61.8% of all the faked products, rising to 80% if 
Hong Kong is included. These data clearly show that, despite the establishment of a Western-
based legal institutional environment, the infringement of IPRs is still a critical issue in 
China, undermining the successful relationship with trade partners. The issue has been 
brought out once again by the USA, guided by the new administration of Donald Trump. The 
approach was motivated by the large amount of losses in specific industries related to China 
rise. On August 18, 2017, the Trade Representative initiated an investigation that supported 
the high levels of infringement notwithstanding the improvements in the legal system. The 
President of USA accused China for a substantial theft of IPRs and unfair business practices, 
taking 2 significant initiatives aiming to finally put an end to the problem. 
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 The first one is the imposition of a first round of 25% tariffs on $34 billion worth on Chinese 
goods which, announced on March, took effect on the 6th of July. The Chinese government 
reacted almost immediately with an equal initiative against US, starting what could become 
the biggest trade war. Additionally, on the 7th of August, the US announced a second round of 
tariffs, which will hit $16 billions of Chinese goods and will take effect on 23th August (Tan 
2018). The starting of a trade war by the USA is going to have certainly an impact on both 
China and USA, but also the whole economic world (Peterson Institute 2018). Oxford 
Economics estimates that the trade war will slow the growth by 0.2 % this year, which will 
probably be higher if variables like rising business uncertainty and supply chain disruption are 
considered (Independent 2018). Additionally, the Bank of England (2018) foresees that the 
global trade will decrease global GDP by 2.5%, having a worse impact on US: 5%. Indeed, 
with respect of US, rising costs are likely to affect consumers who, leading to pressure on the 
Federal Reserve, increase the interest rates and slow growth (US is highly dependent on debt).  
The reason of this trade war is twofold. The first aim is national security: cutting the 
relationship with China to avoid further losses that result from unfair business practices. In 
this regard, there is a debate underway about the legitimacy of the tariffs imposed by Trump 
administration. A large number of critics argue that, under the WTO-based rules, the 
unilateral initiatives by the US are illegal. Indeed, the WTO clearly express that, as part of the 
non-discrimination principle, countries could not discriminate between trading partners, 
implementing unilateral actions unless permitted by the organisation (Gupta 2018). However, 
Trump justifies his policy arguing that tariffs are a necessary tool as a result of the unfair theft 
of US IPRs by Chinese firms and Chinese government (Bryan 2018).   
Secondly, Donald Trump aims to harm the Chinese economy so that structural changes will 
be finally implemented to end the IPRs infringements. Given the above-mentioned costs, it is 
compulsory to wonder if the benefits, represented by the enforcement of IPRs, are higher. The 
answer depends on the identification of the source of the problem and the consequent 
resolution. The trade war will be reconsidered in the last section of the next chapter, in which 
a further conclusion of the comparative analysis between costs and benefits will be drawn.   
 
The second reaction involves initiating a WTO dispute, as happened nearly a decade ago. 
USA requested consultations with China on 23rd March 2018 but, at the time of writing, no 
panel has been established or mutually agreed solution notified (WTO Dispute Settlement 
2018). Citing Yu (2005), this initiative might fall into what it has been identified as a new 
‘cycle of futility’, which represent initial short-term benefits and improvements in the overall 
institutional setting followed by increasingly enforcement deficiencies in the longer term that 
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start a new cycle. The cycle is the result of a focus, by external forces (namely US before 
2001 and WTO afterwards), on the mere legal institutions: this is reasonable if the aim is to 
develop strong rules and regulations. However, as argued by Wang (2004), upon accession to 
the WTO, China has devoted great effort to further converge the legal system towards 
international standards and does not need any more improvements. The author stresses out 
that the high percentage of infringement needs to be found elsewhere, blaming China for not 
having created a multi-dimensional awareness of the impotence of IPRs. This underlines 
indirectly that the source of the problems, and the consequent resolving policies, need to be 
found in the deeper and broader institutional setting, as explained in the next chapter. 
 
Yu (2005) underlines that the first cycle began in the 1992 Memorandum of Understanding 
Between China (PRC) and the United States on the Protection of Intellectual Property (1992 
MOU), which revamped the Chinese intellectual property system. Despite these short-term 
improvements, the second cycle emerged two years later, leading eventually to the 1995 
Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights (1995 Agreement), which included a 
detailed action plan that laid the foundation of the current enforcement infrastructure. 
Notwithstanding this action plan and the "special enforcement" efforts taken by the Chinese 
authorities, a third cycle emerged in less than a year. This time, China and the United States 
were unable to reach a new agreement. Instead, they agreed to a document that mostly 
reaffirmed China's commitments previously made under the 1995 Agreement.  As it has been 
mentioned several times, upon accession to the WTO in 2001, China improved the 
institutional setting in terms of IPRs by converging towards international standards.  
 
The WTO dispute in 2007 described above represent the fourth cycle. While intellectual 
property protection improved during the first few months immediately following the 
agreements, piracy and counterfeiting problems worsened once international attention was 
diverted. Within a short period of time, American businesses again complained to the U.S. 
government, and the cycle repeated itself.  
Figure 1, firstly, shows that, despite the full convergence of the legal system in China towards 
more Westernised IPRs institutions, the score is not as high as should be, compared to 
Westernised countries such as UK (7.92/10) or Switzerland (8.58/10). Legal institutions, 
indeed, are counterbalanced by scarce enforcement that is the real issue in China. The figure, 
more importantly, shows what Yu (2005) has named ‘cycle of futility’. When the USA started 
to accuse China and threaten a WTO dispute in 2006, IPRs sharply improved mirroring a 
more effective enforcement. However, it was a short-term improvement and the trend 
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reversed later on, leading to high infringement levels and new accuse by the USA. This trend 
is going to repeat since the recent WTO dispute addresses issues in the mere legal system in 
terms of IPRs, specifically enforcement issues that involve patents. China will implement the 
suggestions in the short term, witnessing an increase in the IPRs curve, followed by a sharp 
decrease afterwards. Addressing enforcement issues in China, indeed, requires a broader 
institutional intervention rather than keeping the focus on the legal institutions, which are now 
well-developed particularly after joining the WTO in 2001. 
 
 
 Figure 3: Evolution of the IPRs over time. The graph has been created by the writer drawing 
on data from the Fraser Institute (2018). 
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Chapter 3 
 
The key role of the interdependence between political and socio-cultural institutions 
 
Political institutions are among the biggest issues of inadequate enforcement, namely the 
already-mentioned regionally-decentralised authoritarianism layout, which is characterised by 
a clear separation between the central and local governments. An increasing number of 
scholars highlight that, although China presents the same problems in the 21st century as in 
the early 1980, the source of the problem is different (Massey 2006). If three decades ago the 
main issue involved the unwillingness of the central government to provide an effective legal 
system, today the central government is aware of the economic benefits deriving from the 
development of a ‘Westernised system’, but local and ‘isolated’ governments oppose an 
effective enforcement (Cao 2014). The presence of different local governments and several 
layers are justified by the size of the country and lead to high level of confusion since laws 
and regulations could be applied differently depending on the specific agencies (Chung 2015). 
Additionally, other issues emerge if a firm produces a counterfeited product and sells it to 
other provinces. Lack of coordination between provinces, and not only among provinces and 
central government, lengthens the time a case is settled, which might make the technology 
obsolete and undermine the effectiveness of the law enforcement. Further, counterfeiting has 
been an integral part of the local governments activities since it is positively related to 
economic development. Indeed, wholesale markets are established by the provincial 
governments, so shutting down the trade on counterfeiting goods means that the local 
economy would suffer a profound crisis. This pushes local governments to establish close 
relationships with strong local players, which are reinforced by strong informal institutions. 
 
The foundation of informal institutions, namely the socio-cultural dimension, in China is 
Confucianism, whose main feature is guanxi (Buckley et al. 2006): the importance of 
establishing an interpersonal network based upon implicit obligations and understanding 
(Yang 1994), which explains the high score on the collectivism dimension (figure 1). Guanxi 
does not only shape the social life but is also a key component of business practices (Ma 
2009). In this regard, it is widely acknowledged in the literature that a high percentage of 
Joint Ventures (JVs) established between a Chinese and Western partner fail due to 
divergences in culture (Lockett 1988; Verbeke 2013). The former is more focused on group 
work and constantly learning by others while the latter is more individual-based. The lack of 
compatibility with the partner and the significant focus on learning from the partner explains 
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also why the majority of international JVs end with the Chinese partner characterised by a 
stronger competitive advantage. As another example, in the field of Human Resource 
Management (Harzing and Pinnington 2015), practices in China are different from Anglo-
Saxon-countries. Chinese managers tend to adopt group-based performance appraisal 
techniques compared to individual-based methods adopted, for example, in UK, mirroring 
differences in culture. 
 
The importance of being part of a network deeply influence the political institutions: 
provincial governments establish relationships with local players based upon trust, promoting 
and defending a win-win situation that affords financial compensations deriving from 
counterfeiting activities. This shows a practical example of the new institutional theory that 
focuses on the interrelation between formal and informal institutions in shaping the 
institutional framework. Drawing upon the studies by North (1990), Williamson (2000) points 
out that informal institutions belong to ‘Level 1’, which is the most embedded within a 
society and so more challenging to change and evolve over time. Despite a wide range of 
scholars that support the institutional theory in explaining the causes of trade disputes 
between US (and more broadly the WTO) and China argue that local protectionism is the 
main cause, the above analysis, drawing upon Williamson (2000), shows that informal 
institutions, guanxi, plays a key role in the enforcement deficiencies. 
 
Informal institutions are key also in terms of the way Chinese look at the concept of 
individual ‘IPRs’. indeed, the concept emerged quite recently compared to Western countries 
and, despite China now shows a developed legal system, might need more time to be fully 
absorbed within the institutional setting since informal constraints are deeply embedded 
(Lehman 2006). Traditional Chinese views on intellectual property are not to be found in 
legal codes but in code of conducts that are not easy to change in the short term and, further, 
need the right institutional context to be developed. The concept of ‘IPR’ has been introduced 
recently through legal modifications but needs to be fully absorbed by Chinese people. To 
make things more complicated, informal institutions in China are even more context-specific 
than other countries due to the long-term orientation (Hofstede 1990). Chinese people, indeed, 
are highly influenced from what they have experienced in the past. In this regard, since they 
have witnessed a long period of absent IPRs and code of conducts replacing written 
regulations, the recent development of a legal system consistent with international standards 
might encounter daunting challenges.  
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Economic institutions: key area of interventions? 
 
From a mere economic point of view, the long-standing absence of the concept IPR and the 
collectivist and long-term oriented culture mirror an almost-absent private sector and the 
counterpart well-developed public sector guided by a large number of SOEs. Before 1980, a 
private sector was totally absent, and reforms aimed at privatising SOEs and increase 
efficiency started just in the 1990s. Nevertheless, as it might be expected, despite reforms the 
government still plays a key role in the inefficient public sector since China accounts for the 
largest number of SOEs, namely 51,000 (OECD 2017), granting favourable conditions, 
particularly due to deep linkages with the financial institutions (Hasan et al. 2009).  
Indeed, SOEs are often destinations of financial remuneration instead of financing efficient 
and innovative start-ups that push towards a strong need of developing IPRs (Brimall 2008).  
This highly regulatory environment is a disincentive to the development of new innovative 
ideas that promote awareness of a need to develop strong IPRs enforcement and fosters a 
strong sense of suspicion among customers about new entrants with no government support. 
Additionally, new entrants face issues regarding lack of established relationship, which is 
crucial in the Chinese business environment. 
 
Moreover, it should be added that China, despite the outstanding growth rates guided by 
strong informal institutions, is still a ‘developing country’. As such, it is characterised by 
scarce high-tech assets which would promote the incentive of the local government to protect 
IPRs. Indeed, as happened in US, IPRs start to be well enforced if economic institutions 
promote the development of innovative technologies worth protecting.  
 
The World Bank (2001) underlines that the TRIPs Agreement will have a diverse effect 
depending on the current industrial and technological development. Particularly, the report 
stresses out that benefits from protection of IPRs occur only with high incomes and 
technology sophistication. In this respect, Lall (2003) ranked all the countries according to the 
‘competitive industrial performance’ (CIP) index for the year 1998, which includes: Market 
value-added (MVA) per capita, manufactured exports per capita, the share of medium and 
high technology (MHT) products in MVA and the share of MHT products in manufactured 
export. China scores 0.126 on a maximum of 1, placing itself in the medium position. The 
author underlines that medium groups have a mixture of beneficial and non-beneficial effects 
since they are in transition towards fully innovation-based economies, namely at the turning 
point from a developing to a developed country. 
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However, given the current technological capabilities, China has still to rely on imported 
technologies: dependence on foreign technology is as high as 50% in many fields. As an 
example, given the importance of the semiconductor industry to drive innovation, China’s 
government encourage foreign companies to form joint ventures and transfer the technology 
to domestic players, promoting in this way a technology catch-up (Horwitz 2018). This 
contrasts with the necessity to develop the own innovative capabilities, moving up the value 
chain and become more competitive on a global scale. It is believed that a full transition is 
necessary to modify the awareness of IPRs and so the informal institutions. The next section 
will give an insight into the innovation system, which is believed is key in regard to 
enforcement of IPRs, before describing the Chinese reality that fully represents an innovation-
based hub: Shenzhen. 
 
National innovation system: evolutionary perspective 
 
Prior to reforms, China’s innovation system was totally under the control of the central 
government as all the centrally-planned economies, such as Russia. Particularly, the major 
players in China were universities and in-house R&D units in SOEs. The flaw of this system 
was the separation from production activities and around two thirds of R&D investments were 
conducted away from production processes: the situation is the opposite in industrialised 
economies where the industrial sector comprises at least the 60% (Xue 1997). It is widely 
acknowledged, indeed, that industrial research is more efficient since successful innovation 
stems from the interrelation of different functions and the interdependence between user and 
producer. This led to the implementation of reforms to reduce government intervention and 
promoting technology markets. The latter, however, did not develop due to weak absorption 
capacity and less developed social capital. 
Despite reforms, the expenditure by the industrial sector was really low in the 1990s (around 
22%) and level of national investment was much lower that other countries, fluctuating 
around 0.65% as a percentage of the GDP in the 1990s. An article in the Chinese People’s 
Daily, cited by Cao et al. (2006), shows that 75% of enterprises do not employ anybody to 
conduct R&D investments. The industrialisation did not result in strong indigenous 
innovation; China’s economy did not undertake the fundamental evolution from ‘Made in 
China’ to ‘Designed in China’ as countries like USA and Japan did. 
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Moreover, the FDI-based strategy allowed increasing counterfeiting activities through reverse 
engineering practices, which fosters IPRs infringements to catch up with foreign players 
without undertaking domestic R&D investments. Theoretically, indeed, it might be 
conjectured that increasing FDI leads to more competition that might foster more R&D 
investments. However, given the institutional reasons highlighted above, FDI do not promote 
increasing R&D investments, despite the legal improvements upon accession to WTO, but re- 
innovation practices to be more competitive. The same conclusion has been supported by an 
econometric study (Lundin et al. 2007) that analyses the relationship between FDI and 
indigenous innovation by testing, first, the relation between FDI and the structural setting of 
the market, namely the level of competition, and then the effect on domestic R&D, which is 
linked to a better degree of technology update that fosters the development of awareness of 
the importance of IPRs, and so better enforcement to complement an already-mature legal 
framework. 
 
This is the first time that the indirect relationship between FDI and indigenous innovation, 
passing through the level of competition, has been analysed in China and the conclusion is 
not, ex ante, clear. First, FDI, especially greenfield investments, increase the number of 
competitors in the local business environment (Haller 2004), suggesting a positive correlation 
in the first relationship. Alternatively, FDI may raise the level of concentration in the host 
market by ensuring to foreign multinational entrerprises leading positions that reduce the 
number of firms (Aitken and Harrison 1999). 
In regard to the relationship between degree of competition and innovation, economic theory 
gives us little guidance to make exact predictions. On the one hand, indeed, the replacement 
effect by Arrow (1962) highlights that, when competition intensifies, monopoly rents 
decrease along with the incentive to innovate, underlying a negative effect. On the other hand, 
the selection effect outlines a positive relationship since firms might further improve their 
innovative capabilities trying to escape competition (Boone 2000; Aghion and Schankerman 
1999). 
 
The analysis drew upon a large sample of large and medium enterprises compiled by the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, covering the period 1998-2004. Lundin et al. (2007) 
adopt a two-step econometric approach, investigating first the impact of FDI on the market 
structure. The dependent variable is the price cost margin (PCM), calculated as (value added – 
payroll)/ value added: a high level suggests a low level of competition. Findings outline that 
FDI has a negative impact on PCM, but there is a time lag before the competition from FDI 
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has an effect; lag 1 of FDI is statistically insignificant but lag 2 is significant. Adding the 
interaction term of FDI and the Herfindahl index, which represents the degree of 
concentration of the market, the results remain stable.  It can be concluded that FDI imposes 
significant pressure on domestic firms in China, increasing the level of competition. In regard 
to the relationship between the increasing competition (PCM), as a result of FDI, and 
domestic R&D, the results are statistically insignificant using both OLS and GMM. The 
conclusion that can be drawn is that the FDI-based policy does not affect indirectly domestic 
R&D. 
 
The large amount of FDI has been successful in helping the manufacturing system and 
stimulating the impressive growth of China’s high-tech growth, but the value-added activities 
account for 3-4% of the entire value chain (Xing 2011). As a result, the key point is to build 
upon indigenous innovation that substantially increase the value created in the value chain 
and promotes a better enforcement of IPRs, contributing to economic growth and harmonious 
development. Thus, has been recognised by the Chinese government that issued a 15-year 
‘Medium-to-Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology’ in January 
2006, aiming to become an innovation-oriented society by 2020 and world leader by 2050. 
The plan intends to reduce dependency from imported technology, which is the consequence 
of the FDI-based that attempts to transfer technology, while focusing on internal innovation, 
aiming to invest 2.5% of GDP in R&D (Cao et al. 2006). The focus on indigenous innovation, 
which is the critical part of the plan, has been subject to debate since it was associated with 
techno-nationalism. In this respect, a senior official argued that it simply deals with integrated 
innovation drawing upon assimilation and improvements of existing technologies, suggesting 
a continuative dependence upon foreign technologies.  Along with the identification of key 
priorities, such as basic science advanced manufacturing, the plan focused on encouraging 
industrial enterprises to assume a leading role in the innovation system by taxation incentives 
and strengthening human resources. Indeed, China now employs a large labour force of 
scientists, offers more science and engineering degrees than US, the quality of research has 
improved steadily, placing China as the largest producer of scientific papers after US (Xie et 
al. 2014).  
 
However, the system has been so far criticised for its top-down approach, which should be 
integrated with a bottom-up approach to make China finally a fully innovation-oriented 
economy and promoting effective enforcement of IPRs (Schwaag-Serger 2007). What is 
missing in China is what scholars refer to as an ‘organised market’ (Gu and Lundvall 2006), 
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which focuses on networking and interactive learning. Scholars outline that China is viewing 
the current situation as a trade-off between imports from foreign technology and ‘techno-
nationalism’. However, Chinese exponents should consider both perspectives to create 
learning regions (Gu et al. 2016). Reforms should aim at developing networks of firms where 
tacit knowledge is involved, discouraging reverse engineering practices, and so counterfeiting 
activities, and fostering the development of technology upgrade that motivate the willingness 
to protect IPRs. This will bring more value-added activities in the value chain that do not only 
motivate the local government, the real cause of the lack of enforcement in China, to enforce 
IPRS, but also promote awareness among businesses of the importance to protect IPRs. 
Additionally, networks need to focus on domestic needs which are diverse within China, 
suggesting various starting points for innovation and networking consolidation. This will 
create, indeed, a system in which top-down and bottom forces pushes towards a better 
enforcement. 
 
Shenzhen: an example of indigenous innovation 
 
Shenzhen has evolved from being a small fish village and first SEM to an emerging centre of 
innovation, known globally as the ‘Chinese Sylicon Valley’. The city has been characterised 
by outstanding growth averaging 35% through the 1990s and 15% recently, placing itself as 
the region with the highest GDP per capita within the country with over 40 per cent of the 
output came from “innovative” businesses (Huifeng 2018). Shenzhen, no longer receives 
manufacturing orders from foreign companies but domestic players now created their own 
products, implementing a successful shift from a labour-intensive to an innovation-based 
reality, whose value-added activities substantially grew over time reaching 36% in 2014. As it 
has been already theoretically hypothesised, this change in the economic institutions fosters a 
sense of awareness of the importance of IPRs which, coupled with a full integration of the 
local government, enhance the IPRs enforcement. As argued by a large number of domestic 
players (Wired 2016), companies are indeed realising the importance of new ideas, design 
and, consequently, the fundamental role played by IPRs. The region witnessed applications 
for 82,254 patents in 2014, doubling compared to 2009: patents granted amounted to 53,687 
in 2014, up from 25,894 in 2009 (Chen and Ogan 2018). Interestingly, Shenzhen accounted 
for 51.8% of all applied patents in China, more than half within the entire country. 
 
Comparing Shenzhen with the Sylicon Valley in US, the main and huge difference that stands 
out is the role of the government. Unlike SV, central and local government are highly-active 
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and promote entrepreneurial initiatives through financial incentives (Jing and Lee 2017). 
Additionally, the local government is spending RMB21.5 billion ($3 billion) on emerging 
industries, such as new energy, and counterbalance the lack of angel investors with the 
establishment of a fund of 5 billion to focus on angels’ investments (Yu and Haoting 2018). 
Moreover, Shenzhen industrial update has been driven by strong improvements in human 
capital. The number of college graduates constantly increased: college educated talents as a 
percentage of its population amounts to 37.1%, higher than 28.6% in Beijing, and 23.4% in 
Shanghai.  
 
The local government and the development of human capital are interrelated since the former 
contributed to the latter. Indeed, local government tries to attract high-level professionals to 
the region, such as through the Peacock initiative’ launched in 2011: 100 million yuan will be 
provided as a reward to make scientific breakthroughs. As an example, it also launched the 
1st Innovation Competition of International Talents held from November 2015 to April 2016, 
which is open to all IT talents around the world, to win a total of $880,000 bonus plus an 
additional $200 million government subsidies and venture capital (Hong 2016). Further, the 
local government constantly invited renowned universities to establish campuses in the zone 
to build effective university-industry linkages. 
 
Chen and Ogan (2017) underline that the source of astonishing growth in Shenzhen was a 
heavy in-migration that generated several innovative ideas. However, even in this case the 
local government played a key role. As an example, Shenzhen adopted wage reform, 
minimum wage and social insurance package that attracted many skilled workers (Zeng 2012) 
 
Is the ‘Shenzhen effect’ transferable throughout the country? 
 
It is acknowledged in China that industrial clusters might emerge from successful SEZ (Zeng 
2012), such as information and communication technology clusters in Zhongguancun 
(Beijing), the electronics and biotech clusters in Pudong (Shanghai), the software cluster in 
Dalian, and the opto-electronics cluster in Wuhan. Given the substantial differences in growth 
between Shenzhen and other clusters, it is reasonable to believe that little is attributed to 
geographical proximity (to the international marketplace) since all the clusters count on this 
location advantage. Consequently, the main differences rely on the above-mentioned causes, 
namely developed human resource and local government. As an example, in regard to the ICT 
cluster in Beijing, Tan (2006) underlines that lack of entrepreneurial leadership, venture 
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capital and scarce linkages with university led to the stagnation of the cluster. Consequently, 
the implementation of the Shenzhen-like set of policy might, on the one hand, improve 
existing clusters and, on the other hand, develop new ones. 
Generally speaking, as shown in figure 3, despite still lying behind US, China’s labour force 
in science and engineering (S/E) has witnessed a remarkable growth. The figure highlights 
that the bulk of growth occurred between 2000 and 2010 but, if the population size is taken 
into consideration, the percentage amounts to just 0.4%, which is far smaller than US: 3.1% 
(Xie et al., 2014). as a result, despite recent improvements, much attention needs to be 
devoted to human capital development. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Labor force in S/E. Source: Xie et al. (2014) 
 
 
The vision to develop clusters to further ultimate the economic transition has been also shared 
by Crane et al. (2018), who underlined that, in order to reduce the economic disparities 
between the West and East, the only solution is to establish SEZs even in the West. However, 
the West lacks the location advantages, not only in terms of geographical proximity but also 
infrastructure that have been the engine for the East SEZs, fundamental for the initial success 
(Fan et al. 2011). Indeed, in a comparative analysis of Shenzhen and Kashgar, Chou and Ding 
(2015) concluded that the former is simply an exception since the latter, bordering Central 
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and South Asia, did not succeed in attracting the right amount of foreign investments. Fogel 
(2017) suggests that, in order to fully benefit from the transition towards an innovation-
oriented economy, the attention should also be drawn to avoiding the increase in regional 
inequality. In this respect, the Government, aware of the necessity to implement the ‘basics’ 
in the west before further expanding the SEZ policy, issued the ‘Great Western Development 
Strategy’ (China Business Review 2010). The latter focuses on building up infrastructure, 
promoting education and retaining talents. So far, a total of 1 trillion yuan has been spent but 
effect will be visible in the following years. 
 
Further Considerations and short-term initiatives for MNEs 
 
The necessity to take inspiration from Shenzhen and focus on innovation has already been 
internalised by China, namely ‘Made in China 2015’, 15-year ‘Medium-to-Long-Term Plan 
for the Development of Science and Technology’ and the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020). 
The latter clearly outlines the need to build regional innovation by focusing on HRs and 
entrepreneurial incentives (Ministry of Science and Technology 2016). The shift in the 
economic institutions will progressively modify the awareness of IPRs (informal institutions) 
and further improve the institutional setting. it is clear that mere interventions in the legal 
environment, which is already well-developed, and the trade war started by Trump are futile 
attempts. However, during the process the leads to a better enforcement of IPRs, multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) might take initiatives to defend from such an evolving context, until the 
transition period is ended and a fully-developed enforcement setting has been established. 
 
MNEs might take 3 different kind of initiatives: proactive, defensive and networking (Yang et 
al 2004). In the first case, the strategy adopted by coca cola might be successful: setting a low 
price in the market to avoid counterfeiting activities. Indeed, buyers will purchase 
counterfeited products if differences in prices are substantial, but if the original product is 
cheap, this will disincentivise theft of IPRs. however, this strategy depends on the business 
model adopted. An alternative solution might be to specify ex ante, in occasion of partnership 
with local firms, sanctions for the infringements of IPRs, filling the cultural gap between 
Western and Chinese firms. Additionally, a well-known defensive strategy is to acquire a 
potential IPRs infringer in the market, which will reduce indirect costs in the long term and 
further penetrate the market. Finally, networking strategies emphasise the importance to 
cooperate and seek support from the government and enforcement agencies. As an example, 
Microsoft has established training institutes at the government level to increase awareness of 
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IPRs (Microsoft China 2018). Another solution might be to have a direct impact on 
consumers through advertising or indirect effect mediated by deep relationships with, for 
example, media and project sponsors. 
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Conclusion 
 
In today dynamic business world, innovation became the key source of competitive advantage 
to stand out of competition. MNEs are increasingly recognising the need to move up the value 
chain to draw upon more value-added activities and be more competitive on a global scale. It 
is widely acknowledged in the literature, however, that innovation requires a strong and 
significant protection of IPRs, to incentivise the development of innovative businesses. In this 
respect, China felt the need to fill the gap in the institutional framework, characterised by 
scarce IPRs counterbalanced by strong informal institutions, to sustain high economic growth 
rates. The accession to the WTO, given the binding TRIPS Agreement, has been regarded a 
key strategic choice to develop a strong legal environment. However, evidence shows that 
China is still the most IPRs infringer and the priority number 1, as recognised by the 
European Commission. The biggest losses, nevertheless, are suffered by the largest economy 
in the world, the US, constantly in trade deficit with China. 
 
Putting an end to this widely and globally discussed debate is the prime concern of most 
economic players. The WTO dispute settlement, however has been ineffective to solve the 
issue. Figure 3 has shown that, despite short-term improvements in the enforcement of IPRs, 
once the international attention is diverted, key issues reappear in the medium term and 
counterfeiting activities become again the most crucial problem in the Chinese business 
environment. This paper has shown that, the recent WTO dispute initiated by the Trump 
Administration on the 23th of March 2018, will probably have the same result of the previous 
one, leading to what Yu (2005) has termed ‘cycle of futility’. Citing Wang (2004), indeed, 
addressing the mere legal institutions as the source of the problem is a waste of time and 
resources. After joining the WTO, China developed a sufficient and strong legal system 
consistent with international standards, but the key issue, according to the author, is the lack 
of a multi-dimensional understanding of the importance of IPRs, underlying the deeper source 
of the problem: informal intuitions. 
 
Important findings outline, indeed, that the concept of IPRs has been introduced recently in 
the legal environment and might need a significant amount of time to be fully absorbed within 
the Chinese institutional context, characterised by the embeddedness of codes of conducts and 
conventions that replace the rule of law (Hofstede 1990; Lehman 2006). Furthermore, given 
the interdependence between formal and informal institutions (Williamson 2000), the latter 
highly influence political institutions. Indeed, local governments draw upon Guanxi to 
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establish long term relationships with strong local players benefiting economically from 
counterfeiting activities, which are motivated by the concentration of the large part of 
economic activities in the low end of the value chain, favouring reverse engineering practices. 
It is argued that interventions in the economic institutions to incentivise the evolution from a 
manufacturing-based to an innovation-oriented economy will have significant consequences 
on informal institutions. First, the change will foster the awareness of the importance of IPRs 
among business players, progressively moving up the value chain focusing on more valuable 
activities. Second, local government will be more incentivised to protect and enforce IPRs as 
the result of placing innovation as the source of competitive advantage.  
 
As an example, Shenzhen has witnessed a full transition towards an innovation-based hub, 
becoming the ‘Chinese Sylicon Valley’. Not only the region accounts for more than half of 
the patents granted in China, but domestic players started to internalise the importance of 
IPRs as a consequence of the increasing focus on innovation rather than low-cost 
manufacturing (Wired, 2016). The analysis of the successful path witnessed by the region 
might give the right directions for policies to transfer the ‘Shenzhen experience’ throughout 
the country, thus promoting a full transition towards an innovation-based economy. The 
success of Shenzhen originated from 2 main sources: the involvement of an entrepreneurial 
local government and the development of human resources. It is believed that China is aware 
of the importance to improve in these key areas, suggesting that the overall IPRs will 
progressively show progresses and the recent WTO dispute, along with the trade war initiated 
by the US, are mere futile attempts. With respect of human resource development, data show 
an increase since 1980, with higher growth rates from 2010, predicting a further increase in 
the coming years (Xie et al. 2014). 
 
The issue originated from the belief that China would have immediately benefited from the 
TRIPs Agreement. The WTO grant developing countries favourable concessions which, 
however, were not given to China. It was believed, indeed, that China was ready to fully 
benefit from IPRs protection given the impressive economic growth and the already-modified 
legal system. However, China is still a developing country. Lall (2003) highlights that the 
positive gains from the TRIPs agreement are correlated with the economic development. 
Benefits will be visible once China witnesses a full economic transition that will nullify the 
radical influence of informal institutions1.   
  
                                                        
1 Number of words (excluding references but including the abstract in Italian): 13.125 
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